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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, the Minnesota
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Minnesota Statutes
section 82.21, subdivision 2 displaces the common law procuring
1
cause doctrine in disputes over real estate broker commissions. In
spite of recent precedent asserting the statute’s abrogation of the
2
common law, the supreme court in Rosenberg held that Minnesota
real estate brokers can rely on the procuring cause doctrine as an
3
alternative remedy in cases involving commission disputes.
This note first examines some useful history and terminology
regarding real estate commission disputes, the procuring cause
4
doctrine, and Minnesota Statutes section 82.21. It follows with a
summary of the facts of the Rosenberg decision and the Minnesota
Court of Appeals’ and Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis of the
5
case. This note then analyzes the supreme court’s decision to
6
apply the procuring cause doctrine in Rosenberg, and concludes
with a plea to the Minnesota legislature to clarify that the effect of
7
the statute is to abrogate that doctrine.
II. HISTORY AND TERMINOLOGY
A. Brokers, Listing Agreements, and Commission Disputes
1.

Brokers and Listing Agreements

Minnesota law defines a real estate broker as a person who “for
another and for commission, fee, or other valuable consideration . . .
lists, sells, exchanges, buys or rents, manages, or offers or attempts
1. See Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn.
2004) [hereinafter Rosenberg II].
2. See Douglas v. Schuette, 607 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
3. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 326-30.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
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to negotiate a sale . . . purchase or rental of an interest or estate in
8
real estate.” Because of the complexities involved in many real
9
estate transactions, the involvement of a broker is often crucial. In
a typical real estate sale, the broker commonly handles many
aspects of the selling process such as setting the correct price,
developing a marketing plan to attract potential buyers, negotiating
the eventual sale, and performing some, or all, of the final closing
10
duties. Real estate brokers enter into contracts with their clients

8. MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 18(a) (2004) (emphasis added). Minnesota
Statutes section 82.17 recognizes various other ways in which a person can be
considered a broker including, for example, advertising as a broker, securing
loans in connection with mortgages, and selling business-related property. Id. §
82.17, subd. 18(a), (b), (d)-(f). In contrast, the statute distinguishes a “real estate
salesperson” as “one who acts on behalf of a real estate broker in performing any
act authorized . . . to be performed by the broker.” Id. § 82.17, subd. 19.
9. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF REALTORS PROFILE OF HOME BUYERS AND SELLERS: MINNESOTA STATE REPORT 2,
available at http://www.mnrealtor.com/publications/surveys.html. In promoting
the importance of hiring a real estate broker, the National Association of Realtors
states,
In today’s market, many people mistakenly believe that selling a house is
uncomplicated and effortless. However, selling one’s home can often be
even more daunting than buying a home. Establishing a competitive list
price, deciding how to market a home, and timing the sale to coincide
with a purchase of another home are all challenging but important
undertakings that the home seller must manage.
Real estate professionals specialize in assisting buyers and sellers with
these tasks and are knowledgeable in all aspects of the home sales
transaction. They have the experience and expertise to coordinate all
parts of the sales transaction for both buyers and sellers. It is therefore no
surprise that the majority of home sales involve a real estate professional
in some capacity.
Real estate professionals know their neighborhoods better than anyone.
With this knowledge, they help their clients find properties that meet the
needs of first-time buyers, married couples with children, or emptynesters looking to downsize. Additionally, they also assist sellers in
pricing, marketing and selling their homes in a timely manner.
Id.
10. See MoneySense.ca, What a REALTOR Can Do for You That You Can’t Do for
Yourself, at http://www.moneysense.ca/spending/home_mortgage/article.jsp?
content=20030429_135512_4576 (last visited Feb. 10, 2005). According to a
recent survey conducted by the Minnesota Association of Realtors, “the most
important tasks that sellers wanted their agent to perform were help selling the
house within the seller’s time frame (26 percent), help pricing the home
competitively (25 percent) and help finding a buyer (19 percent).” MINNESOTA
ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, Real Estate Industry Scan: Trends, Industry Practice,
Innovation & Change 10, available at http://www.mnrealtor.com/publications/
pdfs/Industry04.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Real Estate Industry
Scan].
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11

through written listing agreements.
A listing agreement is “an agreement between a property
owner and [a broker], whereby the [broker] agrees to try to secure
a buyer . . . for a specific property at a certain price and terms in
12
return for a fee or commission.”
A typical listing agreement
includes, at minimum, the names of the parties to the contract, a
description of the property for sale, the sales price and terms of
13
payment, the amount of compensation, and a termination date.
Generally, by entering into a listing agreement with a property
owner, a real estate broker agrees to find a buyer who is ready,
willing, and able to purchase the owner’s property at the price
specified in the contract and under any other terms contained in
14
the agreement. In practice, however, a broker’s commission is
earned only when the broker “has performed all that he undertook
15
to perform” according to the listing agreement.
This
performance is specifically defined by the exact terms negotiated
11. “In more than half the states, particular provisions of the statute of frauds
or of state licensing or administrative rules or regulations . . . either require a
broker’s employment contract to be in writing or require a written agreement in
order to collect a commission.” 15 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 84C.03[3] (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2004). Although there is no explicit statute
of frauds requirement for listing agreements in Minnesota, “all listing agreements
must be in writing . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(b) (2004). In addition,
Minnesota Statutes address the subject, stating, “No person required by this
chapter to be licensed shall be entitled to or may bring or maintain any action in
the courts for any commission, fee or other compensation with respect to . . . real
property unless there is a written agreement with the person required to be
licensed.” MINN. STAT. § 82.18, subd. 2.
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (7th ed. 1999). Most commonly, a listing
agreement in Minnesota is an “exclusive right to sell agreement,” under which the
broker receives a commission regardless of whether the broker actually makes the
sale. EILEEN ROBERTS, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: REAL ESTATE LAW § 1.10 (2004).
Two other less common types of listing agreements are the “open listing
agreement” and the “net listing agreement.” In an open listing agreement, or
nonexclusive listing agreement, any broker who finds a buyer for the property
owner is entitled to a commission. Id. In a net listing agreement, the broker’s
commission is only “the amount . . . by which the actual purchase price for the
listed property exceeds the price that the seller specified in the listing agreement.”
Id.
13. POWELL, supra note 11, § 84C.03[2][a].
14. Lohman v. Edgewater Holding Co., 227 Minn. 40, 44, 33 N.W.2d 842, 84445 (1948) (“In the absence of a contrary agreement a broker to sell realty is
entitled to his commission when he produces a purchaser ready, willing, and able,
to purchase the property . . . .”); see also John M. Norwood & Cornelius J. Hyde,
Extension Clauses in Louisiana Listing Agreements, 42 LA. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1982).
15. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499,
510, 253 N.W.2d 133, 141 (1977)).
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16

between the broker and the seller.
The concept is relatively
simple: if the broker delivers a buyer to the property owner
according to the terms specified in the listing agreement, the
broker is entitled to a commission. However, this seemingly simple
concept does not always produce the desired results. Because the
typical commission paid to the seller’s broker in a real estate
transaction can range anywhere from five to seven percent of the
17
sales price of the property, brokers can earn, and sellers can pay,
18
large amounts of money for commissions. As a result, commission
disputes are not uncommon.
2.

Commission Disputes

Disputes between real estate brokers and sellers regarding
whether a commission has been earned can take various forms and
arise for any number of reasons. In one situation, multiple brokers
are involved in a sale and more than one of those brokers claim to
19
be responsible for that sale. A second type of problem occurs
upon the prospective sale of property to a buyer, which later fails to
20
close for any number of reasons.
16. Id. (citing Olson v. Penkert, 252 Minn. 334, 342, 90 N.W.2d 193, 200
(1958)).
17. GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 49 (4th ed. 2003). In
response to antitrust price fixing allegations by the U.S. Supreme Court, listing
agreement forms currently “invite sellers to negotiate the amount of the
commission” by leaving the exact amount of the commission out of blank forms.
Id. at 50.
18. For example, according to a recent survey by the Minnesota Association
of Realtors, “[t]he typical home seller [in 2003] sold their home for $190,000 and
then purchased a home for $195,000.” Real Estate Industry Scan, supra note 10, at
10. Assuming an average commission of six percent and a home selling for
$190,000, the real estate broker who both lists and sells a typical Minnesota home
would earn a commission of $11,400.
19. WERNER & KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 111-12 (10th ed. 1993).
When several brokers are involved . . . [i]f the first broker’s efforts result
in a disagreement or if negotiations are abandoned, and thereafter a
second broker steps in and brings the parties together, the second broker
is the procuring cause of the sale. But if the first broker brings about a
substantial agreement and the second broker merely works out details of
the transaction, the first broker is the procuring cause of the sale.
Id. See, e.g., Rees-Thomson-Scroggins, Inc. v. Nelson, 276 Minn. 453, 150 N.W.2d
568 (1967); Neumeier v. Sperzel, 223 Minn. 60, 25 N.W.2d 651 (1946); Dorgeloh
v. Mark, 183 Minn. 265, 236 N.W. 325 (1931).
20. POWELL, supra note 11, § 84C.04[1] (“Where the broker has found a
ready, willing and able buyer, the seller generally cannot defeat the broker’s right
to a commission by failing to consummate the transaction, for example, by
refusing to convey, or by being unable to convey because of lack of clear title.”).
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Although both of the above types of commission disputes have
produced interesting and important case law, this note focuses
specifically on post-termination commission disputes.
These
disputes generally involve the sale of property by the owner or
through a second broker after the termination or expiration of the
21
original listing agreement.
To resolve commission disputes,
Minnesota courts have applied the procuring cause doctrine.
B. The Procuring Cause Doctrine
1.

The Doctrine in General

Under the procuring cause doctrine, a broker is entitled to a
commission if that broker’s efforts are “the efficient cause, but not
necessarily the sole cause of a series of unbroken, continuous
events, which culminate in the accomplishment of the objective of
22
the employment.”
This equitable doctrine is based on the
23
common law doctrine of quantum meruit in that it allows the real
estate broker to prove that the seller has obtained the benefit of
the broker’s services, typically in the form of a sale of property,
24
without paying for those services.
To succeed under the
procuring cause doctrine, the broker must provide evidence “that
[the broker] originated a course of events which without a break in
25
their continuity created a cause of which the sale was the result.”
The broker must prove that his efforts did more than just

See, e.g., Lake Co. v. Molan, 269 Minn. 490, 497, 131 N.W.2d 734, 739 (1964).
21. Steven K. Mulliken, When Does the Seller Owe the Broker a Commission? A
Discussion of the Law and What It Teaches about Listing Agreements, 132 MIL. L. REV.
265, 280 (1991). See, e.g., Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2004); Spring Co. v.
Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 78 N.W.2d 315 (1956); Douglas v. Schuette, 607 N.W.2d 142
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm 460 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990); Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
22. 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 62:19 (4th ed. 1990).
The procuring cause doctrine is commonly used by the broker to “show that his or
her part of the contract was performed,” or as a defense by the property owner to
prevent fraud on the part of the broker. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 236 (2004).
23. Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1013. Quantum meruit is “the
reasonable value of services; damages awarded in an amount considered
reasonable to compensate a person who has rendered services in a quasicontractual relationship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 1255.
24. Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011.
25. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328 (quoting Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn.
51, 56, 78 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1956)).
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“contribute to the result,” but were the means that actually
26
Accordingly, the question of who was the
produced the sale.
procuring cause of a sale varies with the particular facts and
27
circumstances of each case. The procuring cause doctrine has
been applied by Minnesota courts in situations involving brokerage
28
commission disputes for more than a century.
2.

The Procuring Cause Doctrine in Minnesota Courts

The procuring cause doctrine was first applied by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in an 1882 dispute over real estate
29
broker commissions in Armstrong v. Wann. In deciding whether
the eventual purchaser had been procured by the broker in
Armstrong, the court set out the procuring cause doctrine:
All that plaintiff had to do to be entitled to his
commissions was to procure a purchaser ready and willing
to buy upon his employer’s terms. If he did so it would
make no difference that the employer made the bargain
with the purchaser. Plaintiff, however, must have been
the procuring cause of the sale. It must have been the
result of the means and efforts employed by him; must
30
have proceeded from these means and efforts.
26. Id.
27. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 237 (2004).
28. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 327 n.6 (noting that Minnesota has
recognized the procuring cause doctrine for “several decades” and citing Wright v.
M.B. Hagen Realty Co., 269 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. 1978); Stead v. Erickson, 182
Minn. 469, 471, 234 N.W. 678, 679 (1931); Armstrong v. Wann, 29 Minn. 126, 127,
12 N.W. 345, 346 (1882)).
29. 29 Minn. 126, 12 N.W. 345 (1882).
30. Id. at 127-28, 12 N.W. at 346 (citing Murray v. Currie, 7 Carr. & P. 584
(1836); Wilkinson v. Martin, 8 Carr. & P. 5 (1837); Hungerford v. Hicks, 39 Conn.
259 (1872); Gillespie v. Wilder, 99 Mass. 170 (1868); Tombs v. Alexander, 101
Mass. 255 (1869); Earp v. Cummings, 54 Pa. St. 394 (1867); Lyon v. Mitchell, 36
N.Y. 235 (1867); McClave v. Paine, 49 N.Y. 561 (1872); Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N.Y.
124 (1872); Chandler v. Sutton, 5 Daily 112; Wylie v. Mar. Nat. Bank, 61 N.Y. 415
(1875). The specific dispute in Armstrong involved the seller’s direct sale to a
buyer who had originally contemplated purchasing property jointly with a second
buyer through the original broker. Armstong, 29 Minn. at 126-27, 12 N.W. at 346.
Applying the procuring cause doctrine, the court reasoned:
As plaintiff made no bargain with King, and did not, in the negotiation
he had with him and Keigher, bring him to consent to buy, and was not,
during the four months after that negotiation ended, carrying on any
negotiations with him, nor using any efforts with him to induce him to
buy, he was not the procuring cause of the sale, unless it can be assumed
that because of what occurred in the unsuccessful negotiation, King
made defendant the offer which was accepted. This cannot be assumed;
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Since Armstrong, the procuring cause doctrine has been
applied numerous times by Minnesota courts in cases involving real
31
estate commissions.
One case particularly relevant to disputes
32
involving post-termination commissions is Spring Co. v. Holle. In
Spring Co., the plaintiff/broker entered into an exclusive listing
agreement to sell the defendant/seller’s home in exchange for a
33
five percent commission.
After showing the house to several
potential purchasers, the broker presented two offers to the seller
34
on behalf of a purchaser, both of which were rejected.
After the listing agreement expired, however, the seller
executed a separate agreement to sell the property to the same
35
purchaser. The court described the situation as follows:
In October of 1953, without plaintiff’s knowledge, [the
seller] communicated directly with [the purchaser] with
respect to purchasing the property and persuaded him to
look at it again. This time [the seller] offered it for
$35,000, and [the purchaser] quickly indicated his desire
to purchase the property at that figure. An unusual sales
procedure was then adopted, which the trial court found
was resorted to because of [the seller’s] belief that most
listing contracts had provisions protecting the agents
therein on their commissions for six months after the
36
expiration date thereof.
After hearing of the agreement, the broker demanded
37
commissions on the sale.
Applying the procuring cause doctrine in Spring Co., the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that, as a result of his efforts to sell
the property and the offers presented to the seller, as well as the
apparent collusion between the seller and the buyer to deprive the
plaintiff of a commission, there was “ample evidence to sustain a
38
finding that [the broker] was the procuring cause of the sale.”
it is not indicated by the evidence. The fair inference is that after the
failure of that negotiation, King, either from something subsequently
occurring or from something occurring between him and defendant,
concluded to buy.
Id. at 128, 12 N.W. at 346.
31. See, e.g., supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
32. 248 Minn. 51, 78 N.W.2d 315 (1956).
33. Id. at 53, 78 N.W.2d at 317.
34. Id. at 53-54, 78 N.W.2d at 317.
35. Id. at 54, 78 N.W.2d at 317.
36. Id. at 54, 78 N.W.2d at 317-18.
37. Id. at 55, 78 N.W.2d at 318.
38. Id. at 56, 78 N.W.2d at 319.
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To help avoid disputes regarding the payment of commissions
after the expiration of a listing agreement, real estate brokers
commonly include contractual provisions dictating the specific
events that will lead to a commission in the event that a sale is
consummated after the original listing agreement is terminated or
39
expires.
C. Override Clauses, Protective Lists, and Chapter 82 of Minnesota
Statutes
1. Override Clauses and Protective Lists
To provide greater protection from potential conflicts
involving the payment of commissions, many listing agreements
40
Minnesota law defines an override
contain override clauses.
clause as “a provision in a listing agreement or similar instrument
allowing the broker to receive compensation when, after the listing
agreement has expired, the property is sold to persons with whom a
broker or salesperson had negotiated or exhibited the property
41
prior to the expiration of the listing agreement.” One reason for
this type of provision is to protect the broker from a seller who
refuses to accept an offer during the time period stated in the
listing agreement, “only to accept a similar offer from the same
42
buyer shortly after the period has expired.”
Additionally, an
override clause protects the seller by ensuring that “the broker will
work hard to sell the property before the listing agreement
43
expired.”
Property owners and brokers can also provide more security
and avoid litigation by requiring a protective list along with an
override clause. “A protective list is a written list of names and
addresses of prospective purchasers with whom the broker
negotiated the sale or rental of the property or to whom the broker
44
exhibited the property before the listing agreement expires.” A
typical override clause containing a protective list requirement

39. See infra Part II.C.1.
40. ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.12. Override clauses are also commonly
referred to as extensions clauses. See Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011.
41. MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 12 (2004).
42. Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011; see ROBERTS, supra note 12, §
1.12.
43. ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.12.
44. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 15 (2004)).
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might read:
If within 180 days after the end of this contract [Seller]
sell[s] or agree[s] to sell the property to anyone who: (1)
During this contract made inquiry of [Broker] about the
property and [Seller] did not tell [Broker] about the
inquiry; or (2) During this contract made an alternative
showing of interest in the property or was physically
shown the property by [Broker] and whose name is on a
written list [given to Seller by Broker] within 72 hours
after the end of this contract, then [Seller] will pay
[Broker] a commission on the selling price, even if
45
[Seller] sells the property without [Broker’s] assistance.
Both override clauses and protective lists are addressed by
Minnesota law governing real estate brokers.
2.

Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statutes

Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statues regulates real estate brokers
and salespersons and addresses such topics as compensation,
46
contracts, disclosure requirements, and licensing.
Additionally,
Chapter 82 delegates authority to the commissioner of commerce
to promulgate additional rules necessary for carrying out the
47
statutory provisions. In 1982, in response to questions regarding
48
the required contents of a listing agreement, the Commerce
Department created a rule specifying the elements of a listing
49
agreement in Minnesota. Originally, the requirements were set
out in Minnesota Rules 2800.3800, which was later renumbered
50
The legislature codified the rule in Statutes
Rules 2805.1200.
51
section 82.195 in 1993. Chapter 82 was subsequently renumbered
in 2004, and the listing agreement requirements are currently
52
located in Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2. For
clarity, although many of the cases discussed in this note predate
45. Douglas v. Schuette, 607 N.W.2d 142, 145-46 (Minn. 2000).
46. See MINN. STAT. ch. 82 (2004).
47. Id. § 82.47.
48. See Rueben v. Gibbs, 297 Minn. 321, 323, 210 N.W.2d 857, 858 (1973) (“It
will be noted that the statute is part of Chapter 82, dealing with the regulation of
real estate brokers. Nowhere in the chapter is a listing agreement defined.
Common sense would indicate that a listing agreement contain at least an
authorization to sell.”).
49. ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.11.
50. See ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.11 n.9.
51. See ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.11.
52. See MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(b) (2004).
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the codification of the listing agreement rule or the renumbering
of Minnesota’s real estate statute, this note will refer exclusively to
Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statues as renumbered in 2004.
Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2 requires that a
53
listing agreement include certain elements.
Several of these
elements directly address override clauses and protective lists.
Section 82.21 subdivision 2(b)(6) requires that all listing
agreements include:
[I]nformation regarding an override clause, if applicable,
including a statement to the effect that the override clause
will not be effective unless the [broker] supplies the seller
with a protective list within 72 hours after the expiration
54
of the listing agreement.
Further, subdivision 2(e) of section 82.21 adds explicit
requirements regarding the use of protective lists:
A broker or salesperson has the burden of demonstrating
that each person on the protective list has, during the
period of the listing agreement, either made an
affirmative showing of interest in the property by
responding to an advertisement or by contacting the
broker or salesperson involved or has been physically
55
shown the property by the broker or salesperson.
Although the language of the statute seems relatively benign,
there has been recent controversy with regard to whether the use
of an override clause and protective list is required for a broker to
receive post-termination commissions under Minnesota law, and
further, whether the requirements of section 82.21 were intended
56
to abrogate the procuring cause doctrine. Before addressing the
53. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(1)-(10). The specific listing agreement elements
required by the statute are: “a definite expiration date;” “a description of the real
property involved;” “the list price of the property;” “any terms required by the
seller;” “the amount of any compensation or commission or the basis for
computing the commission;” “a clear statement explaining the events [and]
conditions that will entitle a broker to a commission;” information regarding an
override clause (if applicable), including a statement regarding the inclusion of a
protective list; a notice stating that compensation will be determined between the
broker and the client; “a dual agency disclosure statement;” a notice regarding the
seller’s approval of arrangement of closing services by the broker; and for
residential listings, a notice regarding non-payment of commissions in the event
that the seller engages another broker after the expiration of the initial
agreement. Id.
54. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(6) (emphasis added).
55. Id. § 82.21, subd.2(e).
56. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d 320 (2004).
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supreme court’s resolution of this issue, however, it is useful to
examine prior case law addressing Minnesota Statutes section
82.21, subdivision 2 and the procuring cause doctrine.
D. Prior Application of Section 82.21 in Minnesota Courts
1. Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora
In 1986, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the
issue of whether the requirements of section 82.21 (then
Minnesota Rules 2800.3800) abrogate the procuring cause doctrine
57
in Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora.
In that case, the
respondents/sellers entered into a listing agreement with the
58
appellant/broker to sell lakeshore property in Duluth, Minnesota.
After the expiration of the agreement, the sellers enlisted a
different real estate agent and eventually sold the home through
59
that agent. Although the listing agreement included a standard
60
override clause, the broker failed to provide a protective list.
In Lynn Beechler Realty, the court addressed the broker’s
argument that the original listing agreement had been implicitly
extended by the parties, and stated that even if the agreement had
been extended, the “[broker] still should have given respondents a
protective customer list within seventy-two hours of [the
61
termination date].” More importantly, however, the court also
addressed the broker’s argument that it was entitled to a
commission because it was the procuring cause of the sale under
Spring Co. v. Holle. The court stated, “The facts in Spring Co. are
similar to those in this case. However, Spring Co. precedes the
promulgation of [the listing agreement requirements], and does
62
not apply.”
As a result, the court in Lynn Beechler Realty
determined that the override remedy provided in section 82.21,
subdivision 2 was the exclusive remedy through which brokers
could receive post-termination commissions and implicitly held
that the statute abrogated the common law procuring cause
57. 396 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
58. Id. at 718.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 719. The court referenced Minnesota Rules 2800.3800 subparts 4
and 5 (currently Statutes section 82.21, subdivisions 2(d)(1) and 2(e)). Id. at 71920.
62. Id.
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doctrine in those situations.
2.

Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm

In 1990, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again opined on the
intended enforcement of section 82.21’s (then renumbered
Minnesota Rules 2805.1200) listing agreement requirements in
63
Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm. In that case, the respondents/sellers
entered into a listing agreement with the appellant/broker to sell
64
their home. The agreement contained a standard override clause,
as well as an explicit reference to the seventy-two hour protective
65
list requirement. In Realty House, the prospective buyer cancelled
the initial purchase agreement because of costly defects discovered
66
shortly after the expiration of the initial listing agreement. The
sellers subsequently entered into a purchase agreement with the
67
same buyer for a substantially lower price.
Although the trial
court held that the sellers “had a contractual obligation to pay a
commission to [the broker] even though [the broker] failed to
68
provide a protective list after the agreement expired,” the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed.
Relying on its interpretation in Lynn Beechler Realty, the court
commented on the necessity of strict compliance with the override
clause requirements:
The burden of producing a protective list is not great.
The realtor is familiar with real estate rules, knows when
the listing agreement expires, has the information the
protective list requires, and is accustomed to providing
such lists. Thus, even if a purchase agreement has been
signed when the listing agreement expires, a realtor
wishing to protect its commission should provide . . . a
69
protective list.
Although the court of appeals did not directly address the
procuring cause doctrine in Realty House, its holding reinforced the
view that when a listing agreement expired, a broker could only
recover commissions by application of an override clause and

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

460 N.W.2d 917 (1990).
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id. at 920.
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protective list.
3.

Douglas v. Schuette

In 2000, the Minnesota Court of Appeals even more explicitly
addressed Minnesota Statutes section 82.21’s (then codified in
section 82.195) displacement of the procuring cause doctrine in
70
Douglas v. Schuette. Douglas involved the cancellation of a purchase
agreement for 420 acres of land by a buyer who questioned the
71
broker’s business practices.
After the expiration of the listing
agreement
between
the
appellant/broker
and
the
respondent/seller, the seller hired a new real estate agent and the
72
original buyer agreed to purchase the land. The broker filed suit
73
for commissions on the sale.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that the
broker might have been able to recover a commission subject to
the override clause in the original listing agreement, but had not
provided the seller with a protective list as required by Minnesota
74
Statutes section 82.21.
The court responded to the broker’s
argument that the appellant was entitled to a commission as the
agent who procured the eventual buyer by stating, “this court has
held that a real estate agent cannot recover a commission by relying on
75
the procuring-cause doctrine.”
In spite of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ strict enforcement
of section 82.21 in Realty House and clear statements of the statute’s
abrogation of the common law procuring cause doctrine in Lynn
Beechler and Douglas, the Minnesota Supreme Court responded with
a different view in 2004.

70. 607 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
71. Id. at 144.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 145-46.
75. Id. at 146 (citing Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717,
720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added)).
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III. ROSENBERG V. HERITAGE RENOVATIONS, LLC
A. Facts
In July 1997, Gary Rosenberg (Rosenberg), doing business as
Shelter Consultants, entered into an agreement with Heritage
76
Marketing, LLC (Heritage) involving the sale of 350 individual
condominium units in the RiverStation development project near
77
downtown Minneapolis. Under the agreement, Rosenberg served
as the salesperson for the project in exchange for “commissions of
2.5% on coop sales and 3.5% on in house sales,” as well as “a draw
against commissions of $3,000 per month together with an advance
of $1,500 per unit” upon the approval of each purchase
78
The agreement provided that the balance of the
agreement.
79
commissions were to be paid upon closing. The agreement did
not include an express termination date, but the terms stated that
Rosenberg was “to work the model sales center hours throughout
80
the time frame of the project.”
The agreement contained no
81
override or extension clause.
Rosenberg sold condominiums pursuant to the agreement
82
with Heritage beginning in July 1997 and into February 2001. On
February 14, 2001, however, Heritage informed Rosenberg that the
contract was terminated and that he should stop selling
83
condominium units on its behalf. As of February 14, Rosenberg
76. The developers involved in the RiverStation project in fact formed two
corporations to complete the project: Heritage Renovations, LLC to be the owner
and developer of the project, and Heritage Marketing, LLC to provide marketing
and sales services to Heritage Renovations. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 322.
77. Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, No. C7-03-94, 2003 WL
21694604, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 2003) (unpublished opinion)
[hereinafter Rosenberg I]; Brief for Respondent at 6, Rosenberg v. Heritage
Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 2004) (No. C7-03-94) [hereinafter
Respondent’s Brief].
78. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 323.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 323-24.
82. Id. at 323.
83. Id. Although the court in Rosenberg II did not comment on the reason for
the termination of the listing agreement between Rosenberg and Heritage,
Heritage’s brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court provides some insight:
Heritage Marketing and its prospective buyers had difficulties with
[Rosenberg’s] abrasive personality as well as his lack of responsiveness
and failure to staff the model condominiums. Heritage Marketing
received numerous complaints about [Rosenberg], including a written
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claimed to have “almost 40 purchasers under contract[,] . . . 18 as
84
purchase agreements and 20 as reservation agreements.”
85
Rosenberg sued Heritage Marketing, claiming that he was entitled
to commissions on the sales that he procured before the agreement
86
On November 18, 2002, the district court
was terminated.
granted summary judgment in favor of Heritage on grounds that
Rosenberg’s failure to include an override clause in the agreement
87
precluded him from receiving post-termination commissions.
88
Rosenberg appealed.
B. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reconsidered the trial court’s
determination regarding Rosenberg’s entitlement to commissions
89
after his termination from the RiverStation project. To arrive at
its conclusion, the court applied a straightforward application of
Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 as interpreted in Realty House, Inc.
v. Grimm. The court of appeals stated:
complaint from a prospective buyer who accused [Rosenberg] of . . .
“steering” in the sale of the condominiums. When informed of the latter
complaint, [Rosenberg] simply informed Heritage Marketing that the
buyer’s perception was “[its] problem,” evidencing complete lack of
“customer service” mentality.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 6. Not surprisingly, Rosenberg’s brief
described the termination very differently:
On or about January 31, 2001, without any advance warning or any stated
reason, [Heritage] told Rosenberg that [it] wanted Rosenberg to
voluntarily withdraw from the RiverStation venture. Rosenberg refused.
On or about February 1, 2001, [Heritage] claims to have sent a facsimile
termination letter to Rosenberg, although Rosenberg did not receive it.
The letter cites no reasons for the termination. The first time Rosenberg
saw any alleged “reason” for his termination was during discovery at this
proceeding.
Brief for Appellant at 10, Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d
320 (Minn. 2004) (C7-03-94) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief].
84. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 323.
85. In fact, Rosenberg sued both Heritage Renovations and Heritage
Marketing. However, Heritage Renovations was dismissed from the suit as an
unnecessary party because it was not named in the agreement between Rosenberg
and Heritage Marketing. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 324.
89. Rosenberg I, No. C7-03-94, 2003 WL 21694604, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July
22, 2003). The court also considered questions of whether the listing agreement
was valid, whether it was terminable at will, and whether the agreement created a
joint venture between Rosenberg and Heritage. Id. at *2-3.
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Recovery of commissions for sales that occur after
termination of the listing agreement requires that the
real-estate agent include in the listing agreement an
override clause and, after expiration or termination of the
agreement, that the real-estate agent provide the seller
90
with a protective list.
Because the listing agreement between Rosenberg and
Heritage did not contain an override provision and Rosenberg
failed to provide a protective list within the seventy-two hour period
prescribed by the statute, the court held that “[he] could not
recover for any unpaid commissions that he otherwise might have
91
been entitled to after [Heritage] terminated the agreement.”
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
92
93
ruling. Rosenberg appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court handled the disputed
commissions much differently than the lower courts. In Rosenberg,
the court acknowledged that because the agreement between
Rosenberg and Heritage required that all sales close in order for
commissions to be earned, Rosenberg did not earn his
94
commissions at the time the purchase agreements were signed
and thus, Rosenberg had not “performed all that he undertook to
95
perform” under the contract at the time of his termination.
Because of the absence of a contractual remedy, the supreme court
96
looked to precedent involving the procuring cause doctrine.
Citing Spring Co., the court stated that “a broker has a right to a
commission when the broker has been the procuring cause for the
sale, even though the sale is completed after the listing agreement
has terminated and the commission had not been earned prior to
97
termination.”
The court noted that this rule is based on the
90. Id. at *4 (citing Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm, 460 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990)).
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id.
93. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 324.
94. The court noted that “[t]he July Agreement specifies that if a sale does
not ultimately close, any advance given to Rosenberg for the purchase agreement
would be refunded or applied to the next signed purchase agreement.” Id. at 327.
95. Id. (citing Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 510, 253 N.W.2d 133, 141
(1977)).
96. See id. at 327-28.
97. Id. at 327 (citing Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 55, 78 N.W.2d 315,
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principle that “no one can avail himself of the nonperformance of
a condition precedent who has himself occasioned its
98
nonperformance.” Applying these principles to the situation in
Rosenberg, the court reasoned that because Heritage caused the
nonperformance of the closings (the conditions precedent)
required for Rosenberg to earn his commissions by abruptly
terminating the listing agreement, it could not argue that
Rosenberg should not receive commissions on those sales when
99
they eventually closed.
However, the court acknowledged the
possibility that Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 might abrogate the
100
The court then
common law procuring cause doctrine.
examined that possibility.
The court considered two interpretations regarding the effect
101
of Statutes section 82.21.
The first interpretation of the statute
considered by the court involved the possibility that section 82.21
provides a liberal “alternative remedy” to allow brokers to collect
commissions even when they are not the procuring cause of the
102
sale as defined by the common law.
Under this view, the statute
then acts as a limitation on this remedy by “requiring that the
listing agreement include the precise terms, and that the broker
103
take the precise actions, specified in [the statute].” The supreme
court explained this interpretation by noting that the override
remedy provided by the statute is much broader than the common
104
law procuring cause remedy.
The court contrasted the common
law’s requirement that the broker’s work set into motion a
continuous course of events leading to the eventual sale in order to
105
earn a commission, with section 82.21’s override remedy, which
demands only a sale to “any person who . . . contacted the broker
or who showed an interest in the property during the term
106
listing.”
Additionally, the court agreed with this interpretation
318 (1956)).
98. Id. (citing Olson v. Penkert, 252 Minn. 334, 343, 90 N.W.2d 193, 200
(1958)).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 328.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 56, 78 N.W.2d 315, 318
(1956)).
106. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.195, subd. 5 (2002), currently MINN. STAT. §
82.21, subd. 2(e) (2004)).
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because, in the court’s view, section 82.21 does not specifically
mandate the inclusion of an override clause in every listing
contract, but rather “describes what such clauses must contain if
107
they are included.”
The second reading of Minnesota Statutes section 82.21
considered by the court suggested that the statue “so
comprehensively addresses the subject of the effect of the
termination of a listing agreement on a broker’s right to
commissions that the statutory override remedy was intended to be
108
exclusive.” The court noted support of this interpretation by the
109
Minnesota Court of Appeals in Lynn Beechler Realty, but went on to
explain why this interpretation was incorrect.
First, the court pointed to the fact that Minnesota Statutes
section 82.21 contains no explicit language stating that the override
remedy provided in the statute was meant to displace the procuring
110
cause doctrine or any other common law remedies.
The court
noted that normally, when the legislature intends to supplant the
111
common law through statute, it does so expressly.
Second, the court argued that “the legislature expressly
disclaimed any intent to abrogate the common law” both at the time
the statute was first enacted in 1993, and upon its amendment in
112
1994.
The court noted that in 1993, the “Scope and Effect”
section of Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statutes stated: “The
requirement for disclosure of agency relationships set forth in this
chapter are intended only to establish a minimum standard for
113
regulatory purposes, and are not intended to abrogate common law.”
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see Lynn Beechler Realty Co. v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717, 720
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The supreme court noted that the only reason given
supporting the conclusion that Statute section 82.21 abrogated the procuring
cause doctrine by the court in Lynn Beechler Realty was that the common law rule
preceded the statute. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328.
110. Id. at 328-29.
111. Id. at 328. In a footnote, the court cited Minnesota Statutes section
176.031 as an example of this type of language. Id. at 328 n.7. The statute, which
involves Minnesota Workers’ Compensation law, states that “[t]he liability of an
employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability . .
. .” Id. (emphasis added). The court also noted Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile
Insurance statute, section 65B.51, subdivisions 1 and 3, which supplants the
common law by providing that “no person shall recover damages for noneconomic
detriment unless . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
113. Id. (citing Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 309, § 9, 1993 Minn. Laws 1794, 1801
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The court also noted that as amended in 1994, the statute
maintained this intent through the language: “Disclosures made in
accordance with the requirements for disclosure of agency
relationships set forth in this chapter are sufficient to satisfy
114
common law disclosure requirements.”
Third, the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed to its historic
reluctance to allow a statute to abrogate the common law when the
115
intent is not expressed in the statute. The court stated, “Statutory
enactments, even though they provide new procedures to enforce
pre-existing rights at law and in equity, are to be read in harmony
with the existing body of law, inclusive of existing equitable
116
principles, unless an intention to change or repeal it is apparent.”
Finally, the court noted that Minnesota Statutes section 82.21
does not require an override clause in every listing agreement, but
117
makes it optional by including the language “if applicable.” As a
result, the supreme court concluded that genuine issues of material
fact existed with regard to Rosenberg’s procuring cause claims and
118
remanded for trial of those claims.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ROSENBERG DECISION
In Rosenberg, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the
proposition that the use of an override clause under section 82.21
was intended to provide a liberal alternative remedy to the
procuring cause doctrine, while retaining the court’s authority to
119
use the procuring cause remedy when equity requires. In light of
the comprehensive coverage and mandatory nature of the statute,
however, it is likely that section 82.21 was meant to abrogate the
(alteration in original)).
114. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.197, subd. 3 (2002)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Swogger v. Taylor, 243 Minn. 458, 465, 68 N.W.2d 376, 382
(1955)).
117. Id. at 330 (citing MINN. STAT. § 82.197, subd. 2(6)(2002), currently MINN.
STAT. § 82.21, 2(b)(6)(2004)).
118. Id. The court described the result in a Colorado case involving a similar
statute: “A similar conclusion was reached by the Colorado Court of Appeals in
Telluride Real Estate Co. v. Penthouse Affiliates, LLC, 996 P.2d 151, 154 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1999). The court rejected the argument that a statute regulating the
relationships between real estate brokers and sellers was intended to supplant
existing common law, holding that the statute did not eliminate the common law
procuring cause remedy.” Id. Justice Russell A. Anderson and Chief Justice
Kathleen A. Blatz dissented. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 332-34.
119. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328; ROBERTS, supra note 12, § 1.12.
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common law procuring cause doctrine and provide an exclusive
remedy for realtors to recover post-termination commissions.
A. Flaws in the Supreme Court’s Analysis
In order to facilitate its interpretation of Minnesota Statutes
section 82.21, subdivision 2 in Rosenberg, the Minnesota Supreme
Court relied little on the substance of the statute and focused
instead on more generalized reasoning. While there is merit to the
court’s reliance on the principle that the legislature would have
expressly provided for abrogation of the procuring cause doctrine
120
if that was what it intended, the court provided little further
persuasive reasoning regarding the effect of the statute.
1.

The Legislature’s Intent

The court’s chief substantive argument in Rosenberg was that
Chapter 82 lacks an affirmative statement of the legislature’s intent
121
to supplant the procuring cause remedy. While that statement is
true, the court incorrectly argued that the statute states the
legislature’s intent not to supplant the common law through language
122
in the Scope and Effect statement of section 82.22.
To make its
argument, the court relied on the clause, “sufficient to satisfy
123
common law disclosure requirements” in section 82.22.
However, as Justice Russell A. Anderson correctly argued in his
dissenting opinion, the court’s reasoning on this point is flawed
because that clause is, by its location at the beginning of the section
addressing agency disclosure requirements, intended only to apply
124
to that portion of the statute.
For the court’s argument to have
the desired effect, a similar statement of scope and effect would
have to be included before section 82.21, or better, at the head of
the statute. As a result, rather than proving that the Minnesota
legislature expressly retained the procuring cause doctrine in section
120. See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990) (“We have
long followed the presumption that statutory law is consistent with common law . .
. . If statutory enactment is to abrogate common law, the abrogation must be by
express wording or necessary implication.” Id. at 377-78.).
121. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 328-29.
122. Specifically, the supreme court stated that “the initial version of section
[82.22] expressly disclaimed any intent to abrogate the common law and the
amended version expressly recognized that common law requirements continue to
exist and are not replaced by the statute.” Id. at 329.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 333-34 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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82.21, the court inadvertently made a strong argument advocating
that section 82.22 retained Minnesota’s common law agency disclosure
125
requirements.
In addition, if the court’s reasoning is taken one
step further, the legislature’s express statement of its desire not to
abrogate one common law doctrine in one section of the statute
leads to the conclusion that the legislature would have also
expressly retained other common law rules in other sections,
including the procuring cause remedy in section 82.21, if that is
what it intended.
2.

The Mandatory Nature of the Statute

In addition to the above errors in the court’s analysis, the
court misinterpreted the comprehensive coverage of the statute
and the mandatory nature of section 82.21’s override remedy as
“permissive” when it stated that “[t]he statute does not require that
an override clause be included in a listing agreement but treats it as
126
optional—‘if applicable.’” This analysis by the court oversimplifies
the requirements of the statute. Very few of the rules governing
127
real estate brokers and salespersons in chapter 82 are permissive.
Instead, the requirements of the statute are set out in mandatory
128
language, using the terms “must” and “shall.”
This mandatory
language extends to actions for commissions, and also applies to
129
listing agreements, override clauses, and protective lists.
To bring a civil action for commissions under Chapter 82, a
130
broker must have a written agreement.
Further, in the
introductory language of section 82.21, subdivision 2, the statute

125. The agency disclosure requirements of Minnesota Statutes section 82.22
require that a broker “provide to a consumer in the sale and purchase of a
residential property transaction at the first substantive contact with the consumer
an agency disclosure form” that substantially complies with the statutory
requirements for disclosure forms, which are also set out in detail in the statute.
MINN. STAT. § 82.22, subds. 2, 4 (2004).
126. Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 330 (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(d)(2) (2004) (“A listing agreement
may contain an override clause of up to two years in length when used in
conjunction with the purchase or sale of a business.” (emphasis added)).
128. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 332-34 (Anderson, J., dissenting). “There
can be no disputing the fact that licensed real estate brokers are required to
comply with the provisions of chapter 82. The mandatory nature of [section
82.21] is evidenced by the terms utilized by the legislature . . . .” Id. at 332 n.1
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
129. See MINN. STAT. §§ 82.18, 82.21 (2004).
130. Id. § 82.18, subd. 2 (2004).
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requires: “Licensees shall obtain a signed listing agreement or other
signed written authorization . . . before advertising to the general
131
public that the real property is available for sale or lease.”
After the statute sets out that listing agreements are required,
it delineates the necessary elements of those agreements: “All
listing agreements must be in writing and must include [the
132
required elements].”
Section 82.21 requires various elements
133
One of those
that must be included in a valid listing agreement.
elements is “information regarding an override clause, if
134
applicable.” The Minnesota Supreme Court focused on the words
“if applicable” in Rosenberg, holding that the words make inclusion
135
of an override clause entirely optional.
While that statement is
generally true in that parties are not mandated by the statute to
136
include an override clause in all situations, the choice to exclude
the provision necessarily carries certain consequences regarding
the receipt of commissions. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s
interpretation eliminates these consequences.
Under the court’s interpretation, the phrase “if applicable” in
subdivision 2(b)(6) merely suggests that a listing agreement may
include information regarding an override clause if the broker
wants it to contain that information, and if not, the broker can fall
back on the procuring cause doctrine to recover commissions.
This is not the best interpretation, however.
Instead, that
subdivision should be read as a mandate that a listing agreement
must include information regarding an override clause if the broker
wants to recover commissions after the expiration of the listing
agreement. This interpretation makes sense for two reasons.
First, the statute’s definition of “override clause” implies this
137
result.
Section 82.17 of the statute defines an override clause as
“a provision in a listing agreement . . . allowing the broker to receive
138
compensation . . . after the listing agreement has expired.” This
definition suggests that only an override clause will allow a broker
131. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added).
132. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b) (emphasis added).
133. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(1)-(10).
134. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(6) (emphasis added).
135. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 330.
136. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 23 (“The override clause is a
matter of negotiation between seller and realtor . . . . If there is no ‘override
clause,’ then the realtor has no contractual basis to obtain commissions for sales
that close after the listing agreement ends.”).
137. See MINN. STAT. § 82.17, subd. 12 (2004) (defining “override clause”).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
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to receive post-termination commissions; without an override
clause, recovery of those commissions is not allowed. Second,
section 82.21(b)(5) requires that all listing agreements include “a
clear statement explaining the events or conditions that will entitle
139
a broker to a commission . . . .”
This requirement furthers the
implication that a broker who intends to receive commissions after
the expiration of the agreement must include an override clause as
140
one of those “events.”
As a result, read in the context of the
mandatory “must” tone of section 82.21, the phrase “if applicable”
should be interpreted to mean that “applicable” situations are
those in which the broker will have the opportunity to receive posttermination commissions. Accordingly, situations in which this
opportunity is not available, such as the case in Rosenberg, are “non141
applicable” situations.
3.

Time Limits for Enforcement

The court’s interpretation allowing use of the procuring cause
remedy also negates the statute’s time restriction for obtaining
142
As Justice Anderson noted in his
post-termination commissions.
dissent, subdivision 2(c) of section 82.21 prohibits the inclusion of

139. Id. § 82.21, subd. 2(b)(5).
140. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 333 (Anderson, J., dissenting). In dissent,
Justice Anderson stated:
The common law principle relied upon by the majority is nowhere
referenced in the listing agreement, which, according to statute, must
contain "a clear statement explaining the events or conditions that will
entitle a broker to a commission." Minn.Stat. § 82.195, subd. 2(b)(5).
When the legislature provides that events or conditions that will entitle a
broker to a commission must be explained in a "clear statement" in the
listing agreement, I would conclude that a common law claim, neither
mentioned nor explained by a clear statement in a listing agreement, is
barred.
Id.
141. The mandatory nature of chapter 82 can also be seen in the legislative
history involving the codification of the statute in 1993. In a hearing before the
Senate Committee on Commerce and Consumer Protection, a member of the
Department of Commerce described the requirements as “a prohibition that you
cannot maintain an action for commission[s] if you fail to get that particular
listing agreement.” Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 30 n.3 (citing An Act
Relating to Real Estate, 1993; Hearings on S.F. No. 1000 Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce and Consumer Protection; April 7, 1993 (Statement of Dick Gomsrud,
Department of Commerce)). This statement provides additional support for the
conclusion that a broker who fails to comply with the requirements of section
82.21 should not be allowed to rely on alternative remedies outside of the statute.
142. See MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(c) (2004).
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“a holdover clause, automatic extension, or any similar provision, or
an override clause the length of which is more than six months
143
after the expiration of the listing agreement.”
Presumably, the
intended effect of this clause is to limit the length of time in which
a broker can collect commissions after the termination of a listing
agreement. Applying the court’s interpretation, however, a broker
could receive commissions under the procuring cause remedy,
144
which contains no time restraint, far beyond the six-month limit.
This result contravenes this statutory provision.
B. Consumers, Certainty, and Preventing Disputes
1.

Chapter 82 Protects Consumers

The Minnesota Supreme Court ignored the overall intent of
Chapter 82 of Minnesota Statutes in its interpretation in Rosenberg.
In fact, the overall purpose of the statute is not even mentioned in
145
the court’s opinion.
Simply put, Chapter 82 of Minnesota
Statutes was “enacted to protect the public from unqualified or
146
unreliable real estate brokers.”
This overarching goal of
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. See Rosenberg II, 685 N.W.2d at 333 (Anderson, J., dissenting). In dissent,
Justice Anderson stated:
The length of the override provision may not extend more than 6
months beyond the expiration of the listing agreement and, with
exception not applicable here, a broker "shall not" include in a listing
agreement a holdover clause, automatic extension, "or any similar
provision . . . ." Minn.Stat. § 82.195, subd. 3 (2002). The majority
apparently believes that beneath these clear and comprehensive statutory
requirements and prohibitions is a surviving common law equitable
remedy which allows a broker to recover a commission when the broker
is the procuring cause of a sale completed after termination of the listing
agreement. In my view, the majority has read into this listing agreement
a "similar provision" to an override clause that the legislature has clearly
prohibited.
Id.
145. See id. at 320.
146. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 28 (quoting Albers v. Fitschen, 274
Minn. 375, 37[6], 143 N.W.2d 841, 84[3] (1966)). Compare MINN. STAT. § 82
(2004) with COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-801 (2004). The legislative declaration that
proceeds Colorado’s statute governing real estate brokerage relationships states:
The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that the public will
best be served through a better understanding of the public's legal and
working relationships with real estate brokers and by being able to
engage any such real estate broker on terms and under conditions that
the public and the real estate broker find acceptable. This includes
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providing concrete and specific requirements for real estate
brokers can be seen in many aspects of the statute’s construction.
Chapter 82 contains numerous provisions preventing brokers
from engaging in actions which might prove detrimental to the
general public. First, and most importantly, the statute protects the
147
public by requiring Minnesota real estate brokers to be licensed.
Minnesota Statutes section 82.18 states that no person can bring an
action for compensation in a real estate transaction “without
proving that the person was a duly licensed real estate broker . . . at
148
the time the alleged cause of action arose.”
The statute spells
outs specific requirements for the licensure of real estate brokers
including, for example, a required degree of difficulty for brokers
149
examinations, a minimum of two years of “actual” experience in
150
real estate, a score of seventy-five percent on both the uniform
151
and state portions of the licensure examination, and various
152
Second, the statute’s
continuing education requirements.
contract and listing agreement requirements, agency disclosure
requirements, prohibitions, and standards of conduct are in place
to ensure that brokers do not engage in activities that are
153
potentially harmful to the public.
By interpreting section 82.21, subdivision 2 to allow recovery of
commissions even when a broker does not comply with the
requirements of the statute, the court does a disservice to the
engaging a broker as a single agent or transaction-broker. Individual
members of the public should not be exposed to liability for acts or omissions of real
estate brokers that have not been approved, directed, or ratified by such
individuals. Further, the public should be advised of the general duties,
obligations, and responsibilities of the real estate broker they engage.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-801 (2004) (emphasis added).
147. See MINN. STAT. § 82.18, subd. 1 (2004).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 82.29, subd. 4(a).
150. Id. § 82.29, subd. 4(b). However, an applicant may request that the
commissioner waive the actual experience requirement if the applicant can prove
either ninety credits or 270 hours of real-estate related coursework, at least five
consecutive years of “practical” real-state experience, or a combination of thirty
credits or ninety classroom hours and three consecutive years of “practical”
experience. Id. § 82.29, subd. 5.
151. Id. § 82.29, subd. 6.
152. Id. § 82.32. The continuing education requirements required by
Minnesota Statutes section 82.32 mandate thirty hours of continuing education
per year as a student or lecturer. Id.
153. See Lynn Beechler Realty v. Warnygora, 396 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (“However, the Rules are specifically intended to protect
homeowners.”).
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public by exposing sellers to claims for unwarranted commissions
by brokers who have simply failed to meet Minnesota’s statutory
requirements. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted in Realty
House, “the application of this rule may seem harsh when a realtor
has earned a commission, or when . . . there is misrepresentation or
deception. However, the policy considerations behind the Rules
154
Relating to Real Estate support a strict application.”
Although
this public-oriented policy goal may not arise in the case of the
sophisticated parties in Rosenberg, the implications of the case
certainly have the potential to affect unsophisticated sellers in the
future.
2.

Section 82.21 Promotes Certainty and Prevents Disputes

In addition to effectuating the requirements of the statute
intended to generally benefit the public, an interpretation of
section 82.21, subdivision 2 as a broker’s exclusive remedy for posttermination commission claims promotes certainty when disputes
arise. The proposition that Minnesota Statutes section 82.21
promotes certainty is well stated in a passage from Heritage
Renovations’ brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
The Rules [set out in section 82.21] are not at all difficult
or onerous, but they serve the important goal of
protecting sellers from overreaching realtors and
providing for orderly sales of property where the rights of
the seller and realtor are well defined. The Rules create
“bright line” guidance for realtors and sellers. The Rules
avoid confusion and should avoid disputes . . . If this
Court accepted Appellant’s invitation to entirely disregard
the Rules . . . the Court would inflict a great disservice on
all realtors and sellers. The “bright lines” would give way .
. . to a case-by-case analysis of whether, through someone’s
155
notion of “equity,” the realtor “deserves” a commission.
The function of the statute in creating a “bright line” rule is
key to its effectiveness. Real estate brokers are trained, licensed
professionals who know, or should know, the applicable rules and
156
As such, brokers would not be unduly
standards of conduct.
154. Realty House, Inc. v. Grimm, 460 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
155. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 20.
156. See Realty House, 460 N.W.2d at 920. In its brief to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, Heritage noted that “[a]ny real estate agent in Minnesota should be
thoroughly familiar with [section 82.21] and its requirements. It was apparent
from his deposition, however, that despite his claimed twenty years experience as a
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burdened by being strictly held to the state’s statutory
requirements. Without this firm enforcement, the statute is
ineffective and provides only an unenforceable list of suggestions
for real estate practitioners.
The need for certainty in commission disputes is further
illustrated by the nature of Rosenberg’s commission claims and the
burden of analyzing those claims under the procuring cause
doctrine. On remand, Rosenberg will be required to present
evidence that his efforts did more than merely contribute to the
result of the eventual condominium sales for which he claims
commissions. Rosenberg will be required to show that his work was
157
the “producing and effective” result of those sales.
Because of
the fact that almost half of the claimed commissions in Rosenberg
are based on “reservation agreements” rather than purchase
agreements, whether Rosenberg’s efforts produced these sales will
be the subject of controversy between the parties. This conflict is
previewed in Heritage Renovations’ brief to the supreme court:
There is no dispute that [Rosenberg] submitted these
purchase agreements, but it is equally undisputed that
Appellant did nothing to convert the reservation
agreements to purchase agreements or to ensure that all
contingencies were resolved, that option amendments
were executed, that financing was obtained and that the
myriad other necessary tasks were undertaken to facilitate
the ultimate closing . . . after [Rosenberg] was terminated.
The realty firm that replaced [Rosenberg] . . . provided
the necessary realty services [after the agreement was
158
terminated].
The time consuming case-by-case factual examination that will
take place upon remand of Rosenberg’s procuring cause claims is
precisely the type of inefficiency that was meant to be prevented
through the listing agreement requirements in Minnesota Statutes
Section 82.21. If Rosenberg had merely complied with the statute’s
override clause provisions, he would only be required to show that
159
Under
he carried out the activities designated in the clause.
subdivision 2(e) of section 82.21, these activities could be as simple
as proving that a potential buyer made a “showing of interest in the
realtor, [Rosenberg] did not even know what an override clause was.”
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 22.
157. Spring Co. v. Holle, 248 Minn. 51, 56, 78 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1956).
158. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 14.
159. See Norwood & Hyde, supra note 14, at 1011.
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160

property” or was “physically shown the property.”
Requiring the
use of an override clause for a broker to receive post-termination
commissions encourages the parties to a transaction to consciously
negotiate their rights under their agreement, thus preventing
161
lengthy litigation when disagreements arise.
Under the court’s
analysis in Rosenberg, however, parties are allowed to wait until a
dispute arises and force a court to determine the broker’s rights.
Before Rosenberg, Minnesota Courts correctly applied
162
Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2.
In Lynn Beechler
Realty, Douglass, and Realty House, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
properly applied Minnesota Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2 as
a set of mandatory requirements that abrogate the common law
163
and prevent inefficient case-by-case analysis.
Without this
certainty, both realtors and sellers of real estate are left to guess
whether they will be protected by the terms that they negotiated
under state law, or surprised by claims that they could not
164
anticipate.
This could not be the result that the statute was
meant to promote.
V. CONCLUSION
By refusing to allow Minnesota Statutes section 82.21 to
abrogate the common law procuring cause remedy in Rosenberg, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reopened the door for litigation of
numerous commission disputes in which brokers fail to include
override clauses or provide protective lists. Because the court,
through its reliance on lack of express legislative intent to replace
the common law in Chapter 82, refused to interpret section 82.21’s
override remedy as an exclusive remedy that overrides the
procuring cause doctrine, the legislature must step in and clarify
the statute.
To remedy the effects of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Rosenberg, the Minnesota legislature should amend
Statutes section 82.21, subdivision 2 to include an express
statement of its intent to override the common law procuring cause
doctrine. In addition, the phrase “if applicable” in section 2(b)(6)
should be removed and replaced with language clarifying that
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See MINN. STAT. § 82.21, subd. 2(e) (2004).
See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 77, at 20.
See supra Part II.D.
See id.
See id.
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commissions on sales procured, but not consummated before the
end of a listing agreement cannot be enforced if an override clause
is not provided. With these changes to the statute, Minnesota
courts can return to their enforcement of the listing agreement
requirements in section 82.21 as an abrogation of the common law
procuring cause doctrine.
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